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Abstract
Intertemporal decision making involves choices among options whose effects
occur at different moments. These choices are influenced not only by the
effect of rewards value perception at different moments, but also by the time
perception effect. One of the main difficulties that affect standard experi-
ments involving intertemporal choices is the simultaneity of both effects on
time discounting. In this paper, we unify the psycophysical laws and discount
value functions using the one-parameter exponential and logaritmic functions
from nonextensive statistical mechanics. Also, we propose to measure the de-
gree of inconsistency. This quantity allow us to discriminate both effects of
time and value perception on discounting process and, by integration, obtain
other main quantities like impulsivity and discount functions.
Keywords: Complex Systems, Decision Making, Rationality, Discount
Function, Impulsivity, Neuroeconomics, Econophysics
1. Introduction
In contrast to Physics, Economics is based on several axioms and only in
the last decades they have been extensively explored by observation. This
Email addresses: nataliafm@pg.ffclrp.usp.br (Nata´lia Destefano),
asmartinez@usp.br (Alexandre Souto Martinez)
Preprint submitted to Arxiv June 14, 2018
may lead to limitations and deviations when standard economic models are
tested empirically [1]. Most of the revision of these problems and the formu-
lation of new models involve an interdisciplinary context.
Intertemporal decision making involves choices among options whose ef-
fects occur at different moments. The implications of these choices on ev-
eryday activities led to the search of its underlying principles. Mathematical
functions that fairly describe the time discount process have been suggested
by experiments. These experiments involve humans and non-human ani-
mals and are influenced by several factors of variability. The consensus is
that delayed rewards are discounted (or undervalued) relative to immediate
rewards [2].
The discount process may firstly be assigned to changes in perception
(evaluation) of a reward value at different moments. However, individuals,
when forming their intertemporal preferences, may estimate time intervals in
a non-objective manner [3, 4, 5, 6]. Thus, the discount process in intertem-
poral choices comprises not only the effect of rewards value perception at
different moments, but also the time perception effect.
One of the main difficulties in determining discount functions from ex-
periments is the simultaneity of both effects on time discounting. The inde-
pendent analysis of each factor is not allowed by standard experiments that
directly measure these functions.
From discount functions one can obtain other quantities validated by
experiments. The impulsivity measures the strong preference for immediate
rewards over delayed ones, even though the magnitude of the delayed reward
is more advantageous. Also, individuals tend to prefer smaller immediate
rewards in the near future (reflecting impulsivity) but tend to prefer larger
later rewards in the distant future. This preference reversal over time is
referred as inconsistency in intertemporal choices [7].
In this paper we unify the Weber-Fechner and Stevens psycophysical laws
using the one-parameter exponential and logaritmic functions from nonexten-
sive statistical mechanics [8]. This allows us to propose new general discount
value functions. The determination of the intricate dependence between value
and time perception effects in the discount function may be softened explor-
ing their additiveness in the degree of inconsistency. Since value and time
perception are additive in the inconsistency degree, experiments may be de-
signed to measure them independently. By integration of the degree of incon-
sistency, one obtains the impulsivity and discount functions. The standard
experiments used in the context of intertemporal decision making need to be
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reformulated for better understanding of the governing processes.
This study is outlined as follows. In Sec.2 we present an overview of usual
experiments and some theoretical models in intertemporal decision making.
In Sec.3 we describe our main findings and proposals for a new class of
experiments based on the inconsistency degree. Finally, the conclusions are
presented in Sec.4.
2. Intertemporal decision making: theory and experiments
This section presents an overview of concepts and results of the literature
involving intertemporal decision making. We start describing the discount
functions and the standard experiments in intertemporal choices. We present
two theoretical models that aim to describe the time discounting process
observed in experiments: the exponential and the hyperbolic models. Next,
we introduce the impulsivity and the inconsistency, which provide basic tools
to compare exponential and hyperbolic discount models. Other theoretical
models are also addressed. Finally, we describe the psychophysical laws and
the association of the so-called psychophysical effects of time perception to
the temporal discounting models.
2.1. Discount functions
Intertemporal choices refer to choices between options (rewards) whose
consequences occur at different times. Individuals subjected to intertemporal
choices face a conflict (trade off ) between the utility (or value) of an imme-
diate reward and a delayed one. Consider the following examples: choosing
between $10 today or $15 in a month; choosing to spend all earnings today
or to save money for the future; deciding whether smoke or not a cigarette,
to preserve health. In intertemporal choices, the time interval between the
present time and the time when the reward is delivered is referred as delay [9].
Many studies have led to a strong consensus that delayed rewards (V ) are
discounted (or undervaluated) relative to immediate rewards (V0) [2]. The
value (or utility) of a reward V decreases as the time interval till its receipt
(t) increases. The non-discounted (real) value of a given reward is called
objective value. The value to be received immediately, which is equivalent
to the receipt of V0 on a specified delay, is referred as the subjective value of
the reward or indifference point. The subjective value behavior of a reward
as a function of delay, V (t), is analyzed throughout the discount functions.
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The shape of the discount curve is a decreasing monotonic function with null
asymptotic value.
2.1.1. Experiments
Experiments, with both humans and nonhuman animals, have been con-
ducted to determine the indifference points [10, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. In
general, in the experiments involving delay discounting with humans, the
participants choose between two monetary rewards, a smaller but immediate
reward and another of greater value delivered after a given delay. For each
delay, the experiment begins with equal values for both rewards, so that a
given participant chooses the immediate reward. The delayed reward value is
kept constant while the the immediate reward value is decreased. Next, the
participant performs a new decision-making between immediate and delayed
rewards. This procedure is repeated till the delayed reward is preferred to
the immediate one. The last immediate reward value chosen, Vd, is described
as the indifference point of the respective delay. To avoid a possible influence
of the rewards presentation order in the experiments, the reverse procedure is
also examined. The reversed experiment starts from the lowest value for the
immediate reward, so that the delayed reward is preferred. The immediate
reward is then increased till its first value, Vs, is chosen. The indifference
point is obtained from the average between Vd and Vs. The indifference points
obtained for different delays are fitted and described by discount functions.
In most experiments involving intertemporal choices hypothetical rewards
are used. Also, the delays are not experienced by the individual during the
experiment. This type of procedure has the advantage of being cheap and
time efficient.
To check the results validity, few studies have compared experimental
data for procedures involving hypothetical and real rewards. In the latter,
a response is randomly selected among the choices made by the participant,
so that one can receive a real reward, according to value and delay cho-
sen [16]. Up to Johnson and Bickel study [17], no experiment analyzed the
same participants in both conditions (real and hypothetical). In their study,
no significant differences have been observed between real and hypothetical
procedures. However, one must consider that the reward values and delays
used in the real experiments were smaller than those used in hypothetical
procedures. Madden et al. [18] analyzed the same reward values and delays
for both procedures. In all cases, the reward objective value was $10. Again,
no differences were observed between both types of experiment.
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Despite the results, it cannot be stated that hypothetical experiments can
replace real experiments in studies involving intertemporal decision making.
Due to the use of small rewards and delays in real experiments, further stud-
ies are necessary to extend this result to higher reward values and delays.
Furthermore, one should consider the possible influence of experiment se-
quential runs. In these runs, real and hypothetical conditions are evaluated
for the same individual. It is suitable to perform the same procedure at
least twice (sequential) for each participant. This does not guarantee the
independence between the answers of both questionnaires.
There is also a third category of experiments on discount which consists
of real-time measurements. These measures differ from both experiments
described above because participants experience the consequences associ-
ated with their choices (rewards and delays) while completing the experi-
ment [19, 20, 21]. This type of procedure involves short delays (< 90s) and
smaller rewards(< $0.50) compared with other tests [22]. Real-time mea-
surements can better assist researchers in determining short-term changes in
delay discounting, like drug effects of addicts [23, 24, 25]. Moreover, real-
time measurements are the most appropriate tools for the analysis of dis-
count in children. In this case the abstraction necessary to evaluate delays
and rewards is smaller compared to other experiments. Despite the possi-
ble advantages of this method, its use is considerably less common than the
other two experiments. It increases expenses and time required to perform
the procedure [22].
In addition to the varied reward type (real or hypothetical), the standard
experiments of intertemporal choices allows the emergence of other possible
sources of variability, such as:
1. effect of presentation order (ascending or descending) of the immediate
rewards [26];
2. effect of presentation order (ascending or descending) of the delays [27];
3. the signal effect, which suggests different levels of discount for losses
and gains [28] and
4. the magnitude effect, which suggests different levels of discount for
different reward values [29].
Other variability factors or “anomalies” have also been reported in the
literature. Loewenstein and Prelec [30] enumerate a set of anomalies, includ-
ing the gain-loss asymmetry and the delay-speedup asymmetry, and proposed
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a model that accounts for theirs, as well as other intertemporal choice phe-
nomena.
A less explored aspect in these experiments is the length to which par-
ticipants can automatically judge the delayed rewards as uncertain. Even if
the uncertainty about the delivery of these rewards is not taken into account
on the issues of discounting experiments. Patak and Reynolds [31] used a
procedure in which, immediately after the conventional delay discounting
measures, participants received a form where they were questioned about
their notions of uncertainty related to the delayed rewards. As a result, a
significant correlation (r = 0.55) between uncertainty and discount degree
was found. Takahashi et al. [32] examined whether delay discounting is at-
tributable to a decrease in the subjective probability of obtaining delayed
rewards. The results indicated that the subjective probability as a function
of delay decays hyperbolically and a significant positive correlation between
delay discount rate and subjective probability decay rate was found. How-
ever, subjective-probability discounting was not significantly correlated with
delay discounting.
Delay discounting measures are designed to index the discount of delayed
rewards specifically as a function of its delay. However, as previously de-
scribed, the standard experiments for measurements of V (t) are influenced
by variability factors. These factors affect the results interpretation and con-
sequent development of theoretical models, since it is not possible to isolate
the delay as the only variable in the process. Therefore, these experiments
need to be reviewed and reformulated for the correct interpretation of the
processes involved in intertemporal decision making.
2.1.2. Theoretical models
Despite the difficulty of measuring V (t), theoretical models have been
studied to obtain mathematical functions (discount functions) that adequately
describe the experimental delay discounting process. To start, we describe
two of the main discount functions proposed: the exponential and the hy-
perbolic ones.
The standard economic theory assumes rational decision makers. In this
model, the present value of a future reward decreases exponentially [33]:
V0n(t) = V0e
−k0t , (1)
where V0n and V0 correspond, respectively, to the subjective and objective
reward values, and k0 is the degree that an individual discounts delayed re-
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wards. Higher k0 values correspond to discount curves with more pronounced
decay.
In the exponential discounting model, the preference between two tempo-
ral rewards does not depend on the time the choice is made. If the rewards
are displaced by the same time interval, the preference between them remains
the same.
However, experimental results [16, 18, 21, 34, 35, 36] show that the dis-
count of a reward according to its delay is better described by a hyperbolic
function [13]:
V1n(t) =
V0
1 + k1t
, (2)
where V1n and V0 correspond to the subjective and objective reward values,
respectively, and k1 is a free parameter.
In the following, we introduce some concepts used in the intertemporal
choices context. These concepts are useful to understand the delay discount-
ing features that lead to its better description by a hyperbolic (and not a
exponential) function.
2.2. Impulsivity and degree of inconsistency in intertemporal choices
In intertemporal choices, Impulsivity is defined as the strong preference
for smaller, immediate rewards to greater, delayed ones [7]. For example,
suppose the following question: “Do you prefer $10 in a year or $15 in a year
and a week?”. If an individual A prefers the first option ($10 in a year) while
B prefers the second option ($15 in a year and a week), it is said that A
is more impulsive than B because A prefers a smaller, but more immediate
reward, whereas B prefers to wait a longer time interval to receive a greater
reward.
The term “impulsivity” is not restricted to the issues involving delay
discounting. Studies have tried to verify whether discount measures as-
sess the same process as the more traditional psychometric impulsivity mea-
sures [37, 38]. However, few studies have compared these two measure types
and there is still a huge need of evaluating this relationship. Here, to avoid
the various connotations attributed to “impulsivity”, we use the definition of
“discount rate” as a measure of impulsivity in the context of intertemporal
decision making.
The discount rate in intertemporal choices is [7]:
I = −
1
V
dV
dt
, (3)
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the relative variation of the discount function V . The opposite behavior to
impulsivity is self-control.
Returning to the previous example (where individual A is the more im-
pulsive than B), consider now the following question: “Do you prefer $10
today or $15 in a week?”. If individual B (who chose the second option in
the previous question) now prefer the first option ($10 today), his intertem-
poral choice is said to be dynamically inconsistent, since in both cases the
same gain ($5) is obtained in the same time interval (one week).
Experiments involving humans and nonhuman animals have shown that
individuals tend to prefer smaller immediate rewards in the near future but
tend to prefer larger later rewards in the distant future. This preference rever-
sal over time is referred as dynamic inconsistency in intertemporal choices [7].
Suppose that a smaller ($7) but immediate reward is delivered at the
instant tS, while tL represents the instant of delivery of a larger ($10) but
delayed reward. The subjective value of both rewards decays as delay in-
creases, till their respective decay curves intersect at a instant tE before both
rewards delivery. If a choice is made at any time after tE , the smaller imme-
diate reward is preferred, even if their value is smaller than the other reward,
reflecting impulsivity. However, if the choice is made at some time before tE ,
the larger later reward is preferred, reflecting self-control.
The quantity to measure the inconsistency degree was defined by Prelec
in 2004 [39] and interpreted by Takahashi, in 2010, as the discount rate
temporal variation:
I =
dI
dt
, (4)
where I is the discount rate defined by Eq. 3.
2.3. Exponential and hyperbolic models
Once the discount rate and inconsistency degree have been defined in the
intertemporal choices context, we proceed with the analysis of the exponen-
tial and hyperbolic discount functions.
For the exponential decay model (Eq. 1), the discount rate is constant
I0n(t) = k0 , (5)
it does not depend on the delay and I0n(t) = 0.
For the hyperbolic discount model (Eq. 2), the discount rate is a decreas-
ing function of t:
I1n(t) =
k1
1 + k1t
. (6)
8
A reward value is strongly discounted in relatively short delays, but it is
discounted at a more moderate form as the delay increases. For this model,
Eq. 4 can be written as:
I1n(t) = −
[
k1
1 + k1t
]2
= −[I1n(t)]
2 = H[I1n(t)] , (7)
where
H(I) = −I2 . (8)
The inconsistency degree for the hyperbolic discount model is non-null and
can be written as a function of the discount rate I1n.
Studies in intertemporal choices show that a reward discount rate de-
creases as the delay increases [29]. This behavior is adequately described by
the hyperbolic discount model. In this case, as described above, the discount
rate is a decreasing function of t, resulting in higher discount rates for smaller
delays.
Moreover, as previously described, experiments involving humans and
nonhuman animals showed a preference reversal over time. The exponential
discount function is not able to predict this inconsistency, since I0n = 0.
Assuming the same discount rate for both rewards, the discount curves of
the smaller immediate reward and to the large later do not cross, so that
the preference between them does not change, regardless of the moment
when the decision is made. For the hyperbolic function, the discount rate
for both rewards is inversely proportional to the delay, resulting in discount
curves that intersect. This behavior, as described above, allows a simple
interpretation for the inconsistency experimentally observed in intertemporal
decision making [10].
2.4. Other Models
Although the hyperbolic model describes delay discounting better than
the exponential one, the experimental data are not properly adjusted with
this function. It overestimates the subjective value for short delays, while
underestimates it for large ones.
Rachlin [40] suggested a discount function where the delay value is raised
to a power g: V (t) = V0/(1 + k1t
g). This function is a particular case of the
hyperbolic model (Eq. 2), since V1n(t
g) = V0/(1 + k1t
g). Myerson and Green
proposed [41]:
V (t) =
V0
(1 + k1t)g
. (9)
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For g = 1, Eq. 9 reduces to the hyperbolic model of Eq. 2. When g < 1,
a reward subjective value is more/less sensitive to changes in shorter/longer
delays than in the hyperbolic model. Experiments [41, 42] show g 6= 1,
indicating a need for a generalized model as described. Mckerchar et al. [36]
set the data from an experiment involving intertemporal decision making and
showed the Rachlin and Myerson-Green models fit better the experimental
results than the Eqs. 1 and 2.
In 2006, Cajueiro [43] used a one-parameter generalization of the expo-
nential function:
expq˜(x) =

 limq˜′→q˜(1 + q˜
′
x)
1
q˜
′ , if q˜x ≥ −1
0, otherwise
(10)
where q˜ is a free parameter, expq˜(x) = e
x as q˜ = 0 and expq˜(0) = 1, for all q˜.
The inverse of the q˜-exponential function, called as q˜-logarithm function, is
defined as:
lnq˜(x) = lim
q˜′→q˜
xq˜
′
− 1
q˜′
, (11)
where q˜ is a free parameter, lnq˜(x) = ln(x) as q˜ = 0 and lnq˜(1) = 0.
The generalized functions of Eqs. 10 and 11 are originated from the non-
extensive thermodynamics of Tsallis [8] and have been geometrically inter-
preted [44] and can be applied in population dynamics [45, 46, 47] and to
usual distributions in complex systems [48, 49, 50, 51, 52].
Using Eq. 10, the q˜-generalized discount function is written as [43]:
Vq˜n(t) =
V0
expq˜(kq˜t)
=
V0
(1 + q˜kq˜t)1/q˜
, (12)
where V0 is the objective reward value and kq˜ a impulsivity parameter at
t = 0. For q˜ = 0, Eq. 12 is equivalent to the exponential discounting function
(Eq. 1) and for q˜ = 1, to the hyperbolic discount function (Eq. 2). Calling
q˜ = 1/g and kq˜ = gk1, one retrieves the Myerson and Green model (Eq. 9).
For the q˜-generalized model, the discount rate is:
Iq˜n(t) =
kq˜
[expq˜(kq˜t)]
q˜
, (13)
and the time variation of this discount rate is:
Iq˜n(t) =
−k2q˜ q˜
(1 + kq˜q˜t)2
= q˜H[Iq˜n(t)] . (14)
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This relationship can be separated into three distinct cases [51]: (a) Iq˜n <
0 para q˜ > 0 (decreasing impulsivity); (b) Iq˜n = 0 para q˜ = 0 (exponential
discounting, consistent intertemporal choices) and (c) Iq˜n > 0 para q˜ < 0
(increasing impulsivity).
The hyperbolic discount model is a particular case of (a), where q˜ = 1,
and the exponential discount model corresponds to the case (b). Initial
experiments [7] show that, in most cases, individuals make decisions following
a decreasing impulsivity pattern as a function of t [case (a)].
The Cajueiro model unifies the previous models but still lacks a fun-
damental interpretation of q˜. Takahashi [10] has given a phychophysical
interpretation for q˜ and kq˜ [7].
2.5. Exponential discounting with Weber-Fechner time perception
Although Eqs. 9 and 12 have been suggested empirically, Takahashi et
al. [3] included the psychophysical effects of time perception to the process of
discounting in intertemporal choices.
The (invariant) ratio between stimuli that reach the possibility of being
distinguished - called supraliminal stimuli - was measured by Weber in 1834.
Later, Fechner (1860) formally expressed this invariance in the Weber’s frac-
tion (w), as the first psychophysical law :
w =
∆φ
φp
=
φc − φp
φp
, (15)
where φc and φp are perceived stimuli in a given sensory modality, having
between them a threshold ∆φ 6= 0. The Weber’s fraction is dimensionless
and can be expressed as a percentage of the standard stimulus, which is
specific to each sensory modality.
Possibly, there is a dependency between the ability of species discriminate
stimuli of a particular sensory modality and the constancy in the expansion
or contraction process of the sensation to the physical reality. According
to Fechner, the dependency between perception and stimulus is logarithmic.
This relationship is known as the second psychophysical law or the Weber-
Fechner law :
τ(t) = a ln(1 + bt) , (16)
where τ is the subjective time, and a and b are psychophysical parameters.
If one discounts delayed rewards exponentially (Eq.1), but with a subjec-
tive time perception following the Weber-Fechner law (Eq.16), his/her time
discounting is [3]:
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V0f (t) = V0e
−k0τ = V0e
−k0a ln(1+bt) =
V0
(1 + bt)g
, (17)
where b and g = k0a are free parameters.
The discount rate for this case can be written as:
I0f(t) =
bg
1 + bt
. (18)
Note that I0f is a decreasing function of t when b and g are positive, resulting
in preference reversal over time. In this case, the inconsistency degree is
expressed as:
I0f (t) =
−bI0f (t)
1 + bt
= F[I0f (t)], (19)
where
F(I) =
−bI
1 + bt
. (20)
The generalization of models from the functions q˜-logarithm and q˜-expo-
nential has attracted the attention of researchers in different contexts [45,
46, 48, 50, 51, 52]. Between the difficulties of these generalizations, however,
is the interpretation of q˜ in terms of the parameters describing the studied
phenomena. For Eq.12, using the ratios q˜ = 1/(k0a) and kq˜ = k0ab, it appears
that this model is mathematically equivalent to the exponential discount
model with time perception of Weber-Fechner (Eq.17). This equivalence
was described by Takahashi [10] and allows an interpretation for q˜ and kq˜
from the psychophysical parameters b and k0a describing the Weber-Fechner
discounting [7].
2.6. Exponential discounting with Stevens time perception
The relationship between perception and psychophysical stimulus was
also examined by Stevens [53]. For Stevens, the perception and stimulus are
related by a power law, known as the third psychophysical law or the Stevens’
law :
τ(t) = c(1 + bt)s , (21)
where c and s > 0 are psychophysical parameters. If s < 1, the subjective
time decreases as t increases, resulting in an overestimation of small time
intervals and an underestimation of long ones. In contrast, when s > 1,
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subjective time grows with the increase of t (underestimation of small time
intervals and overestimation of long ones).
Takahashi et al. [4] were the first to proposed a time discounting model in-
corporating Steven’s power law of time perception. If an individual discounts
delayed rewards exponentially (Eq. 1), but with a subjective time perception
following the Stevens’ law (Eq. 21), its time discount is a stretched exponen-
tial function:
V0s(t) = e
−kp(1+bt)s , (22)
where kp = k0c and s are free parameters. For this model, the discount rate
is:
I0s(t) = kpbs(1 + bt)
s−1 . (23)
Note that I0s is a decreasing function of t, with s < 1 and kp > 0. The
inconsistency degree is:
I0s(t) = kpsb
2(s− 1)(1 + bt)s−2 =
b(s− 1)
1 + bt
I0s
= (1− s)F[I0s(t)] . (24)
Takahashi et al. [10] performed experiments involving intertemporal choices
with 26 volunteer students. Their parameters were estimated from the in-
tertemporal choice equations involving models without time perception ef-
fects (exponential discounting and hyperbolic discounting) and models that
include this effect (Weber-Fechner discounting and Stevens discounting). The
Weber-Fechner discount model (Eq. 17) best fitted the experimental values.
This result is in agreement with other similar studies [2]. Nevertheless, the
Stevens’ discount model (Eq. 22), given by the stretched exponential func-
tion, fitted the data better than the hyperbolic discount model (Eq. 2). The
exponential discount model (Eq. 1), which reflects time consistency, was the
worst function to describe the experimental results.
3. Results
In the following we show two important results. The first is a particular
and unprecedented unification of the psychophysical laws of Weber-Fechner
and Stevens, obtained by using the q˜-logarithm function. Next we show
that the inconsistency degree (I) allows independence between the effects of
value and time perception. Finally, we suggest the need of a new class of
experiments to analyze the discount process in intertemporal choice.
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3.1. Unification of the psychophysical laws
A successful attempt to unify the psychophysical laws of Weber-Fechner
and Stevens was made by Wong and Norwich in 1997 [54]. Here, we present
an unprecedented approach of this unification, using the q˜-logarithm func-
tion. From the Stevens’law (Eq. 21), we write: (τ−c)/s = [c(1+bt)s−c]/s =
c[(1 + bt)s − 1]/s. Using this relation and the definition of Eq. 11 we rewrite
Eq. 21 as:
τ(t) = a lns(1 + bt) + c (25)
where a = cs and c = τ0 is interpreted as a basal sensitivity. Let us take
the constant a as an independent quantity of s and c. For simplicity, we
take null basal sensitivity (c = 0). This equation corresponds to a new
unification of the psychophysical laws of Weber-Fechner and Stevens, where
for the particular case s = 0, we retrieve the Weber-Fechner law and, for
otherwise, the Stevens’ law.
The unified form of the psychophysical laws (Eq. 25) can be used in
association with the exponential (Eq. 1) and the hyperbolic (Eq. 2) discount
models. The functions:
V0u(t) =
V0
exp[k0a lns(1 + bt)]
(26)
I0u(t) =
−d lnV0u
dt
=
I
(0)
0 [s lns(1 + bt) + 1]
1 + bt
(27)
I0u(t) =
dI0u
dt
=
b(s− 1)
1 + bt
I0u(t)
= (1− s)F[I0u(t)] (28)
with I
(0)
0 = k0ab, refer to exponential discount and for hyperbolic dicounting:
V1u(t) =
V0
1 + k1a lns(1 + bt)
(29)
I1u(t) =
−d lnV0u
dt
=
I
(1)
0 [s lns(1 + bt) + 1]
[1 + k1a lns(1 + bt)](1 + bt)
(30)
I1u(t) =
dI0u
dt
= −I21u −
b
1 + bt
I1u(t)
= H(I1u) + (1− s)F[I1u(t)] ; , (31)
with I
(1)
0 = k1ab.
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Furthermore, from Eqs. 25 and 12 one obtains a generalized function for
the discount process involving the time perception psychophysics:
Vq˜u(t) =
V0
expq˜[kq˜a lns(1 + bt)]
(32)
The expressions of impulsivity and inconsistency for this generalized model
are written as:
Iq˜u(t) =
I
(q˜)
0 [s lns(1 + bt) + 1]
[expq˜(kq˜a lns(1 + bt))]
q˜(1 + bt)
(33)
where I
(q˜)
0 = Iq˜u(0) = kq˜ab and
Iq˜u(t) = −q˜I
2
q˜u(t) +
(s− 1)b
1 + bt
Iq˜u(t)
= q˜H[Iq˜u(t)] + (1− s)F[Iq˜u(t)] . (34)
From Eq. 32, one obtains particular models from the variation of param-
eters q˜ and s. For s = 0, which corresponds to the Weber-Fechner time
perception, we write:
Vq˜f(t) =
V0
expq˜[kq˜a ln(1 + bt)]
(35)
Iq˜f(t) =
I
(q˜)
0
(1 + bt)[expq˜(kq˜a ln(1 + bt))]
q˜
(36)
Iq˜f(t) = −q˜I
2
q˜f(t)−
b
1 + bt
Iq˜f (t)
= q˜H[Iq˜f (t)] + F[Iq˜f (t)] (37)
For q˜ = 0, which corresponds to the exponential discount model, Eqs.
35, 36 and 37 correspond to Eqs. 17, 18 and 19, respectively. For q˜ = 1, we
obtain:
V1f(t) =
V0
1 + k1a ln(1 + bt)
(38)
I1f(t) =
I
(1)
0
(1 + bt)[1 + k1a ln(1 + bt)]
(39)
I1f (t) = −I
2
1f (t)−
b
1 + bt
I1f (t)
= H[I1f (t)] + F[I1f (t)] . (40)
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3.2. Additive property of inconsistency
Table 1 summarizes the possible associations between the discount mod-
els without time perception (exponential discounting, hyperbolic discounting
and q˜-generalized discounting) and the psychophysical laws (Weber-Fechner
law and Stevens’law), including the unified form we have proposed.
As a consequence of the results involving intertemporal choices, the dis-
count process, comprises not only the effect of rewards value perception at
different moments, but also the time perception effect. Even though, these
effects act simultaneously on the discount process and they do not allow an
independent analysis of the influence of each one in the discount function
form. Our aim is to show that the analysis of the discount process by mea-
suring the inconsistency degree (I) can provide a solution for the dependency
of value and time perceptions.
As the main result, we find that, for each association of value and time
perception effects, it is possible to dissociate the functions that describe the
inconsistency in two parts: one describing the value perception effect and
the other the time perception one. Moreover, the total value of the incon-
sistency degree is obtained from the sum of these two terms. For a better
understanding, consider Table 1. Its first column relates the exponential
discounting model with the psychophysical effects of time perception. For
these cases, the inconsistency degree reflects only the contribution of the
time perception effect, since the inconsistency degree for the exponential
model is null. Similarly, the first line of the inconsistency degree expressions
reflects only the value perception effect. For other associations, the total
inconsistency degree is composed of the sum of value and time effect com-
ponents. For instance, the hyperbolic discounting model in association with
the Weber-Fechner time perception results in a total degree of inconsistency
(I1f ) composed by the sum of the hyperbolic discounting term (H(I1f )) and
the Weber-Fechner time perception term (F(I1f)). Both components can be
written as a function of the discount rate (I1f ).
This finding shows that the standard experiments of discounting in in-
tertemporal choices need to be reformulated. Since the quantity that allows
additivity between both effects is the inconsistency degree, its direct deter-
mination favors the understanding of the determinants in discount process
and their respective contributions. The V and I expressions can then be
obtained by successive integration of I.
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Table 1: Discount models in intertemporal choices. Subindexes 0, 1 and q˜ represent the: exponential, hyperbolic and q˜-
generalized discount models, respectively. Subindexes f ,s and u represent the: Weber-Fechner, Stevens’ and unified laws,
respectively. Note that, from all associations, only five cases were considered in the literature so far: the three models
with no perception effect (exponential, hyperbolic and q˜-generalized) and the association of the exponential discounting with
Weber-Fechner and Stevens time perception.
H(I) = −I2 ; F(I) = −bI/(1 + bt)
Exponential discounting (0) Hyperbolic discounting (1) q˜-generalized discounting (q˜)
V
(
t
)
No perception (n) Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 12
(rational agent)
Weber-Fechner (f) Eq. 17 Eq. 38 Eq. 35
Stevens (s) Eq. 26 Eq. 29 Eq. 32
Unified form of
Eq. 26 Eq. 29 Eq. 32
psychophysical laws (u)
I
(
t
)
=
−
(
d
V
/
d
t
)
/
V No perception (n) Eq. 5 Eq. 6 Eq. 13
(rational agent)
Weber-Fechner (f) Eq. 18 Eq. 39 Eq. 36
Stevens (s) Eq. 27 Eq. 30 Eq. 33
Unified form of
Eq. 27 Eq. 30 Eq. 33
psychophysical laws (u)
I
(
t
)
=
d
I
/
d
t
No perception (n) I0n = 0 I1n = H(I1n) Iq˜n = q˜H(Iq˜n)
(rational agent)
Weber-Fechner (f) I0f = F(I0f ) I1f = H(I1f ) + F(I1f ) Iq˜f = q˜H(Iq˜f ) + F(Iq˜f )
Stevens (s) I0s = (1 − s)F(I0s) I1s = H(I1s) + (1 − s)F(I1s) Iq˜s = q˜H(Iq˜s) + (1− s)F(Iq˜s)
Unified form of
I0u = (1 − s)F(I0u) I1u = H(I1u) + (1 − s)F(I1u) Iq˜u = q˜H(Iq˜u) + (1− s)F(Iq˜u)
psychophysical laws (u)
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4. Conclusions
The neoclassical economic theory assumes rational decision-makers where
the discount of real rewards in time is characterized by an exponential decay
model. Experiments involving humans and non-human animals show that
this function cannot adequately describe the results for the discount process
in intertemporal choices. This process is better described by hyperbolic dis-
count models. The discount process in intertemporal choices involves not
only the effect of rewards value perception at different moments, but also the
time perception effect.
Time discounting measures are designed to index the delayed rewards
discount specifically as a function of the delay to their delivery. The stan-
dard experiments are affected by several factors of variability. These factors
difficult the data analysis and consequent development of theoretical mod-
els, since it is not possible to isolate the delay as the unique variable in the
discount process. Furthermore, the concurrent action of value and time per-
ception effects does not allow an independent analysis of the influence of each
factor in determining discount functions. For better understanding the pro-
cesses involved in intertemporal decision making the traditional experiments
need to be reviewed and reformulated.
Here, we have unified the psicophysical laws and proposed a very general
and unified model for the discount process. With this general model, we show
that it is possible to dissociate the inconsistency degree I in two independent
parts of percepction: one for value and the other for time. Thus, the direct
analysis of the inconsistency degree is the natural measure that favors the
interpretation of the discount phenomenon. The discount functions and rates
can be obtained by successive integration of I.
The association of the time perception psychophysical effects to the de-
cision making violates the rational agent assumption based on the classic
economic model.
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